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Commercial bank credit is a useful tool for promoting economic growth especially at the
early stages of development. It has been observed that between 1996 and the early part of
2000, the growth rate of real credit to the private sector declined significantly in Namibia.
This period coincided with observed strong demand for commercial bank loans. There has
therefore been public discourse on the possibility of a restriction in the supply of credit by
commercial banks and hence the occurrence of a credit crunch in the economy since
commercial bank lending capacity did not fall. This paper attempts to provide some evidence
in this regard by examining the main determinants of commercial bank credit in the economy
and ascertaining if credit has been demand or supply constrained. This has been done
through a survey of disaggregated data in the banking industry and an estimation of a
switching regression model to identify regimes of excess supply and demand. Although it
is difficult to determine in the face of obvious demand factors the extent to which the credit
slowdown can be attributed to credit supply factors, our results show that supply factors
did play a major role.
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I. Introduction
The availability of credit is a major factor for the promotion of rapid
economic growth. This derives from the importance of credit in consumption,
investment and capital formation. Production credit has been identified in a
number of studies as a major constraint on speedy economic growth.1 Financial
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institutions, particularly commercial banks, are considered very important in
this process through their willingness to lend money. Traditionally, commercial
banks in Africa finance mainly firms’ working capital and to a limited extent,
leasing finance for machinery. Rarely do they directly finance investment in
plant and machinery, buildings and research and development. And yet,
productive credit is indispensable particularly for small and medium scale firms.
The results of a survey in the mining and manufacturing sectors in South Africa
(Fielding, 2000) show that smaller firms suffer credit constraint. The same study
posits that the shortage of formal sector credit to the private sector is a major
factor in the poor investment performance in South Africa over the past decade.
Elsewhere, the experience of bank-based financial systems typified by
Japan and Germany and the newly-industrialising south-east Asian developing
economies show that banks especially at the early stages of development are
very crucial for financing productive enterprises (Mayer, 1988; Beck and
Levine, 2000). On the other hand, the ability of business firms and other
private sector operators’ to borrow is also considered crucial as this may
impact on the pace and tempo of economic activity. Thus, in this regard,
efforts are often geared towards identifying the factors that influence the
demand for, and supply of, credit in the economy.
For quite sometime now, the Namibian economy has witnessed a substantial
slowdown in credit growth. Real credit to the private sector more than halved
between 1995 and 2000 falling from 15.72 per cent to 7.01 per cent. This
situation tends to suggest that a credit crunch exist in the economy.2 The joint
occurrence of a decline in private sector credit and growing commercial banks
net transfers to neighbouring South Africa has often led to the conclusion that
domestic enterprises are not able to effectively utilise the available supply of
credit in the economy.3, 4However, a slowdown in credit growth is not always
1 In an aggregative study for 10 SADC countries, (including Namibia), Allen and Ndikumana
(2000) found credit to private sector positively related to real GDP growth.
2 In this study, we define a credit crunch as any leftward shift in the supply curve of credit,
which could be demand or supply driven. This enables us to investigate the causative
factors.
3 Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa belong to the Common Monetary Area
(CMA).
4 All but one of the five commercial banks in Namibia are branches of banks with head
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symptomatic of a demand driven credit crunch. The slowdown could be supply
driven. Similarly, the occurrence of net transfers by commercial banks in the
face of dwindling domestic supply of credit may not be explained sufficiently
by a lack of demand. Figure 1 shows the extent of these transfers between 1996
and 2000. What is disturbing about this transfer is that even for periods when
domestic lending rates are high, and domestic demand has not slowed down,
such net transfers have persisted.
5 Redlining is said to occur when some categories of borrowers are totally excluded from
the credit market.
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Figure 1. Commercial Banks Net Transfers to South Africa (NTRS)
Given that lending rates in South Africa are for most of the period lower
than in Namibia, other factors like the need for commercial banks to avoid
perceived credit risks as well as the possibility of the occurrence of “redlining”
could have been at play during this period.5 Thus the objective of this work is
to examine whether a supply constrained credit crunch actually existed in the
Namibian economy during the period 1996-2000.
This study is divided into five parts. Section II examines major
macroeconomic and credit trends while in Section III a review of some of the
theoretical issues, which we consider pertinent for the behaviour of commercial272 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
bank lending in a developing economy framework, is attempted. In Section
IV, a switching regression model of the demand for and supply of commercial
bank loans is estimated using quarterly data for the period 1993-2002. This
model in addition to shedding some light on the main determinants of credit,
enables us to capture regimes of excess supply and demand in the economy.
Finally in section V, we summarise our main conclusions.
II. Major Macroeconomic and Credit Trends
With a per capita income of approximately US$1,800 and an annual real
GDP growth rate of about 3 % (1990-99), Namibia is ranked as one of the
fastest growing countries in Africa. Its gross national savings estimated at
about 18.8 % of GDP outstrip the gross domestic investment of 16.0 %.
Coupled with a positive current account surplus, which hit about 5 % of GDP
in 1999, Namibia is also an exception among African countries in having an
excess of savings over investment as well as a surplus in the current account.
The major economic activities are mining, which accounts for close to 24 %
of GDP and 70 % of export earnings, agriculture which supports directly or
indirectly about 70 % of the nation’s population, and accounts for close to 12 %
of exports consisting mainly of cattle and fisheries, and a growing
manufacturing sector. Over the years, efforts have been made to ensure that
the level of fiscal deficits, which has orbited between 1.1 and 6.1 %, is kept
relatively low. Currently, the deficit stands at about 3.6 %.
Inflation levels in Namibia have generally followed a downward trend
falling from a high of 11.9 % in 1991 to 7.9 % in 1998. With the increase in
oil prices in 1999, the introduction of the value added tax (VAT) in 2000, and
the sharp depreciation of the exchange rate in 2001, the inflation rate started
rising again, reaching a high of 10.8 % in the first quarter of 2002. This will
be the first double-digit average annual inflation recorded since 1996.
Interest rates in Namibia generally monitor the rates in South Africa, which
between 1999 and 2000 witnessed a general downward trend. Although real
lending rates have remained positive, real deposit rates in recent times have
become negative partly due to the low level of interest rates charged by
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spread between lending and deposit rates which is attributable to the lack of
competition in the nation’s financial system.
In Namibia, bank credit account for close to 85 % of total (formal) domestic
credit to the private sector. Commercial bank credit to the private sector has
grown substantially since 1990, but the growth rate slowed down considerably
since 1996. Real credit to the private sector grew at an annual average rate of
17.8 % between 1991 and 1995.6 However, between 1996 and 2000 it fell to
3.14 %. The slowdown in the growth rate of domestic credit during the second
half is often attributed to the tight monetary policy stance adopted by many
emerging markets central banks, especially after the Asian financial crisis of
1997/98 and the expansion of the financial markets.
However, a careful examination of disaggregated data on commercial bank
credit tends to establish that these factors may not have sufficiently explained
the slowdown in credit supply during this period. Other factors such as
commercial bank risk-averse behaviour could have featured prominently. For
instance, it is observed that episodes of declines in the supply of credit have
co-existed with periods of increasing real interest rates. Through the period
1996 to 1998, interest rates were on the increase and the demand for credit
did not fall, yet the growth in the supply of credit declined persistently. Credit
outstanding declined by 4.2 % during this period for reasons that cannot be
fully attributed to demand.
Moreover, there are evidence that point to increased risk aversion by banks
particularly since the middle of 1998, which go to confirm that banks were
deliberately restraining lending during the period. First, we observed a decline
in risk weighted assets to total assets from 76 % to 66 % between 1998 and
2001. The risk-weighted assets of banks consist essentially of their loans.
Second, the share of overdrafts in total bank lending also declined from 42 %
to about 30 % over the period as banks have tended to exercise more control
over their lending. This becomes more evident when it is realised that
collateralised lending has been on the increase during this period.
Collateralised lending as a ratio of total loans rose from about 20 % to 26 %
between 1997 and 2001.
6 Even if allowance is made for the outlier growth of 32.3 % in 1991, the growth rate of
14.17 % recorded between 1992-95 is still outstanding.274 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Finally, there was a tendency for average lending rates to move in closer
tandem with prime rates in recent times, suggesting that banks have
increasingly shifted their lending to relatively safe customers.7 The close
movement in the two rates which was discernible prior to the introduction of
regulatory sanctions early in 1997 is being re-enacted again particularly since
1999.
III. Theoretical Underpinnings of Commercial Bank Lending
Behaviour in Namibia
The traditional thinking on the relationship between interest rates, the
supply of credit by commercial banks and economic growth is rooted in the
loanable funds theory. According to this theory, the demand for loanable funds
is assumed to be a declining function of the interest rate while the supply by
banks is an increasing function. There is therefore an equilibrium interest
rate at which the demand for loanable funds by firms is exactly equal to the
supply by banks and other financial institutions and the market is cleared.
Thus, it is expected that as interest rates on loans fall, the demand for investible
funds should rise. Until recently this conventional market clearing analysis
has remained the foundation for most theoretical and empirical deduction on
the relationship between credit and interest rates. Two main considerations
make this simplistic approach to the interest rate-credit-investment link rather
inadequate for many developing countries. First is the assumption that a fall
in the rate of interest will lead to an increase in the demand for loans by
investors. Doubts have been expressed as to whether bank credit necessarily
constitutes the basis on which investment is undertaken in developing countries
given the low level of financial development. Second, for various reasons,
7 Each of these arguments should be taken alongside the overall body of evidence provided
in this paper. For instance, it is possible that the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets
is declining due to a fall in demand for loans but granted that we have not been able to
establish a decline in demand for loans, this argument is not feasible. Second, the decline
in the spread between average lending rate and the prime rate could be a result of the low
interest rates that is being granted by banks on restructured loans with falling interest rates.
Again, this will not be applicable in our case since falling interest rates were generally out
of the question during this period except for the latter part of 2000.275 WAS THERE A CREDIT CRUNCH IN NAMIBIA BETWEEN 1996-2000?
the rate of interest may not equilibrate the demand and supply of commercial
bank loans in which case commercial banks may have to ration the available
credit using non-price means.
The finance of physical investment in plant and machinery is the main
preserve of non-financial firms. The way by which these entities come by
their funds has been a major source of debate for many years. What has
emerged as a coalescence of views is that non-financial firms, particularly at
the early stages of development, rely considerably on commercial banks as a
source of start-up funds. This is more so in developing countries where the
financial markets are at the early stages of development thus foreclosing the
use of equity finance and retained earnings. Self-finance might be relatively
low because of poor incomes. Thus the low level of financial development is
actually a primordial reason for the use of bank credit for investment financing.
In a similar vein, at the heart of the transmission mechanism is the
discussion on how monetary impulses are transmitted to investment and output
growth. The possibility of the effectiveness of a credit channel outside and
independent of the interest rate channel gives further weight to the role of
credit in the economy. Both the bank lending and broad credit channel (both
sub-sets of the credit channel) agree that a tightening of monetary policy may
cause the supply of bank loans to decline and initiate changes in the investment
behaviour of small and large firms. Such changes, it is argued, could
substantially affect investment and hence economic growth. The prevalence
of evidence on the effectiveness of the credit channel as against the real interest
rate channel in the transmission process of monetary policy, particularly in
developing countries, again emphasise the role of the supply of credit in the
growth equation of developing countries.8 Namibia’s membership of the CMA
substantially limits her ability to manipulate interest rates to achieve any
expansionary monetary policy goal. In a recent work in the research department
of the Bank of Namibia, it was found that the transmission from credit to the
business sector to private investment, though occurs with a lag, is very strong
(Ikhide and Uanguta, 2002).
8 This should not come as a surprise given the state of financial development in many
developing countries and the dependence of the real interest rate channel on the efficacy of
financial markets.276 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
The second issue is very relevant for this study. The possibility that the
rate of interest might not equilibrate the demand for and supply of credit
raises the prospect that there might be genuine borrowers that may not have
access to credit due to some form of rationing. Earlier, it was argued that the
possible co-existence of high interest rates and decline in the supply of credit
even in the face of a relatively stable demand might be indicative of a risk-
averse behaviour by commercial banks. This may be evidence of the existence
of a backward bending supply curve of loans by commercial banks for higher
levels of interest rates. In this situation, the expected return on a loan is not a
monotonic function of the nominal interest rate of the loan.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) attribute this phenomenon to adverse selection
resulting from asymmetric information. Asymmetric information occurs
because banks do not have information about each potential borrower’s
investment project and therefore are not able to calculate the project’s riskiness
since they do not know the probability distribution of returns on the projects.
But the borrowers do have more information about the project and are able to
calculate the risk and expected returns on the project better than the banks.
Adverse selection sets in because at high interest rates enterprises with
relatively low risk projects decide not to borrow while risky enterprises will
attempt to borrow at the high interest rate. At high interest rates, only
enterprises with high expected returns (high risks) on their projects will wish
to borrow. Thus at high interest rates, the proportion of high-risk projects in
the bank’s total lending portfolio is greater than at low interest rates. The
increase in interest rates will have two opposing effects on the expected value
of banks’ returns. First is the direct effect of the interest rate increase for a
given population of borrowing firms which increases the banks expected
returns and produces higher revenue and second, the indirect effect which
changes the risk of this population (Freixas and Rochet, 1999). The latter
effect reduces expected returns because a higher interest rate causes the bank
to have a greater proportion of its loans invested in risky projects. Beyond a
certain level of interest rate, the indirect effect of an increase in interest rate is
greater than the direct effect. The existence of adverse selection explains
why banks are not willing to charge higher interest rates and hence the interest
rate on bank credit may be less than the interest rates that would equate the
demand and supply of credit leading to credit rationing.277 WAS THERE A CREDIT CRUNCH IN NAMIBIA BETWEEN 1996-2000?
The financial crisis of late 1997 which exacerbated an upward rise in
lending rates may have generated some adverse selection problems as only
individuals and firms who are willing to increase their returns or refinance
their debts borrowed at the higher interest rates. This had the effect of
increasing the share of risky or insolvent clients among borrowers. The sharp
rise in non-performing loans to total loans between 1997.2 to 1999.2 will





Figure 2. Non-performing Loans as a Ratio of Total Credit
to the Private Sector (NPLR %)
Credit rationing may also occur due to the non-price elements of a loan
contract such as collateral requirements (Baltensperger, 1976). Here a
borrower is turned down not as a result of his inability to pay the rate of
interest on the loan but because he does not have enough collateral to support
his loan request. In a similar vein, credit is not a perfectly divisible good. A
bank may be unwilling to lend to a borrower who is willing to borrow more
at a given interest rate if this will increase the risk of the bank. In either case,
some rationing occurs since the equilibrium interest rate ceases to be a linear
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Finally, credit rationing also occurs when some categories of borrowers
are totally excluded from the credit market. Commonly referred to as redlining,
it occurs because borrowers do not have enough future cash flows or collateral
to match their demand for credit. This may have been very relevant to the
Namibian case. After the spurt in interest rates initiated by the financial crisis,
and in the face of a lack of any form of credit rating system, banks had limited
access particularly to new entrants to the credit market, and were thus unable
to screen out risky borrowers.9
IV. Modelling the Supply and Demand for Credit in Namibia
So far we have tried to establish that there was a contraction in domestic
credit in the second half of the last decade in Namibia. We have also provided
some evidence that supply considerations on the part of banks may have played
some role due mainly to perceived increase in the risk of default by borrowers.
In this section we intend to provide more empirical evidence on whether the
fall in bank credit resulted from supply or demand factors by modelling the
demand and supply of commercial bank loans in the economy during the
period under consideration.
Several studies have adopted different approaches towards this end. Among
others, Domac and Ferri (1999a), and Dollar and Hallward-Driemier (1998)
used survey evidence on changes in bank lending and firm borrowing to assess
the incidence of a credit crunch. The main shortcoming of the survey approach
is that they can be seriously biased. For example, a tight monetary regime
can reduce demand for credit and respondents may see this as lack of demand.
Domac and Ferri (1999b) developed a conceptual framework based on the
credit view of monetary policy to analyse the existence of a credit crunch in
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. They argued that a
9 New entrants to the credit market included previously disadvantaged groups who were
excluded (redlined) from the loans market through a policy of segregation that prevailed
during the apartheid era. There are evidence of denial of  access of blacks to opening of
bank accounts and consequently to any form of credit during the apartheid era in Namibia
and South Africa. See the report on Black Economic Empowerment Commission, Bee
com South Africa (1999).279 WAS THERE A CREDIT CRUNCH IN NAMIBIA BETWEEN 1996-2000?
widening of the spread between the lending rate and a representative rate on
risk-free assets while at the same time real bank credit is falling represents
evidence that the demand for loans could not have declined by more than the
supply of credit. Their results corroborated this view and thus concluded that
credit crunch was widespread in these economies after the Asian crises
affecting mostly small-sized firms. Agenor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister (2000)
used a two-step econometric approach to elicit information on bank excess
liquid asset on the existence of a credit crunch in some East Asian economies
after the crises that befell those economies in the last decade. The first step
involved the estimation of a demand function for excess liquid assets by
commercial banks. In their second step, they established dynamic projections
for the periods following the crisis and assessed whether or not residuals
were large enough to be viewed as indicators of involuntary accumulation of
excess reserves. This enabled them to draw conclusions on whether the credit
crunch was demand or supply driven.
The approach by Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) using a switching regression
framework to analyse the behaviour of real private credit in Korea and
Indonesia has been slightly modified for our present study. In this approach,
both supply and demand functions for credit are estimated. Thereafter, we
determine whether supply or demand was the constraining factor. This
approach enables us to identify the main determinants of the supply and
demand for credit and in addition resolve the relative size of the demand and
supply profiles for the period under investigation. Both issues have a number
of policy implications. Identifying variables in the demand and supply process
will enable policy makers to focus appropriate policy actions on such variables.
On the other hand, the isolation for instance of a supply constrained credit
growth may tend to suggest the need for structural measures such as regulatory
changes or interventions by the central bank to remove the obstacles to growth.
Thus, in this section we attempt to model the credit market in Namibia using
a disequilibrium approach, which will enable us to identify regimes of excess
supply and demand.
A. Model Formulation
The supply of credit by commercial banks is assumed to depend on a280 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
number of variables among which are lending capacity, total deposits, the
interest rate on loans, the level of economic activities in the country, and the
level of prices. Lending capacity (Ct) defined as the difference between total
commercial bank liabilities plus net worth adjusted for cash in vault, capital
accounts and required reserves is expected to be positively related to the supply
of credit (Ls
t). Commercial bank loans are made on the basis of their total
deposit (Dt). Other things equal, an increase in the level of deposits should
lead to a rising level of loans by commercial banks. The average (nominal)
lending rate (lt) denotes the profitability of bank’s lending activities. Thus
this variable is expected to have a positive effect on the supply of credit by
commercial banks. Finally, three variables are used as measures of the level
of economic activities. The stock market index, (Mt), is used as a measure of
the buoyancy of the economy and is positively linked to the supply of credit.10
The expected inflation rate, (ePt), is negatively related to the supply of credit
as banks are supposed to be more cautious in lending in a high-inflation
regime.11 We also tried expected real income, (eYt), as a determinant of the
supply of loans in our estimation. The theoretical basis for this is that higher
expected income is associated with lower moral hazard and default risks and
lenders should therefore be expected to issue more loans as expected income
10 The use of the stock market index as a measure of the buoyancy of the economy may
raise some eyebrows especially after our argument on the relative underdevelopment of
the financial market. Our use of this variable stems from the very rapid growth of the
Namibian stock market in the last decade. At present, it is the third most developed stock
market in Africa going by stock market indicators like market capitalization, market turn
over and stock market index. Namibia is classified as one of the most developed financial
markets in Africa (See, “Promoting Sound, Accessible, Development Oriented Financial
Sectors in Africa”, World Bank, 2000). Finally, most institutions listed on the Namibian
Stock exchange are also listed on the larger Johannesburg Stock exchange. An increase in
the level of economic activities on both exchanges could serve as an indication of
productivity increase and hence stimulate the demand for credit.
11 The relationship between inflation and economic activity is sometimes questionable. For
instance, the conventional, downward-sloping Phillips curve does not represent a
fundamental relationship as this may change as policymakers’ beliefs about the economy
change. Moreover, inflation may move up and down in response to shocks occurring in the
economy which may not have been accommodated by the learning process which is
presumed in the estimation of inflation (see, for instance, Bharat Trehan, 1999). However,
we have used the inflation rate in this study for lack of a better variable.281 WAS THERE A CREDIT CRUNCH IN NAMIBIA BETWEEN 1996-2000?
rises. In an alternate regression, we also tried the spread between lending and
deposit rates, lst, to test our argument on the existence of credit rationing (and
hence a backward bending supply curve) in the economy. Thus the supply of
credit is specified as follows:
Ls
t = a0 + a1 Dt + a2 lt + a3 Mt + a4 ePt + a5 Ct + a6 eYt  (1)
Expected income (eYt), output gap, (Y_t), the real rate of interest (Rt), and
the expected inflation rate (ePt) explain the real demand for credit (Ld
t). The
demand for credit is expected to depend negatively on the real rate of interest
as bank business customers may be expected to delay investment when interest
rates are rising. The inflation rate is used here as a proxy for general
macroeconomic condition and is negatively related to the demand for credit.12
Expected decline in inflation may also affect credit demand by increasing the
real cost of debt payments. This is the debt deflation phenomenon. Thus, it
might be necessary to distinguish between expected and unexpected inflation.
In our specification of the demand equation, we have included unexpected
inflation (uPt) computed as the difference between actual and expected inflation
as one of the explanatory variables.
Expected income is expected to affect credit demand positively. The
inclusion of the output gap (Y_t) as additional explanatory variable is intended
to gauge the impact of deviations of output from its long-term trend as
measured by expected income. The inclusion of this output gap may help to
proxy the demand for credit during periods of falling income. The argument
here is that during falling incomes, firms may seek greater credit financing to
maintain their level of production. Hence, estimated demand for credit does
not fall simply because of a shrinking output. Inclusion of only expected
12 The exact relationship between the level of prices and the demand for credit has been a
source of confusion in empirical works. Pazarbasioglu (1997) argues that a higher rate of
inflation would erode the value of nominal debt and will thus be positively related to the
demand for credit. Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) however argue that periods of rising prices
connote general macroeconomic instability and will tend to discourage the demand for
credit. Moreover, rising prices reduces the real value of borrowers’ income and hence
discourages credit demand. In this analysis we adopt the latter view, as this is more likely
to be the situation in a developing economy.282 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
income will tend to bias the results against finding a credit crunch since
estimated credit demand would, as a matter of fact, fall with the decline in the
output level. The demand for credit is specified as,
Ld
t = b0 + b1Y_ t + b2 eYt + b3 lt + b4 Pt + b5 uPt                                             (2)
The expected change in output is calculated as the fitted value of a
regression of actual GDP on its past values and changes in the stock market
index. The idea here is to capture forward-looking expectations of the level
of economic activity on current credit demand. All variables except the interest
rate are estimated in their log-linear forms. To remove seasonal effects, the
variables were all deseasonalized prior to the tests for stationarity and
subsequent estimation.
B. Estimation Method
A fall in actual credit (Lt) could be attributed to a falling supply of credit,
(Ls
t), falling demand for credit, (Ld
t), or both. There is a key identification
problem here in attributing the observed changes in actual private sector credit
to underlying movements of the credit supply or credit demand function. This
identification problem is tackled by using a switching regression framework.
We can rewrite equations 1 and 2 as
Ls
t = a X1t + u1t,u 1t ~ N(0, ó11),  (3)
Ld
t = b X2t + u2t,u 2t ~ N(0,ó00),                                                                                      (4)
where, corr (u1t, u2t) = ñ10, X1 and X2 are vectors of exogenous variables, and
u1t and u2t are residuals.
If we assume that the market for bank loans clears instantaneously, the
interest rate equilibrates the demand for and supply of credit. However, as
argued earlier, interest rates may not adjust instantaneously and some amount
of credit rationing may occur. The demand for credit need not equal its supply
as some disequilibrium exists. The (observed) actual level of credit is
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Lt = min (Ls
t, Ld
t)          (5)
In the absence of sufficient information on the price adjustment process,
and assuming that the errors are normally distributed random variables, the
model itself allows the determination of the probabilities with which each
observation belongs to the demand or supply regime. In an exogenous
switching model (Maddala, 1983), separation into one regime or the other is
determined outside the structure of the model. Two possible cases are the
observed separation indicators where there exists an observed indicator
variable S which equals 1 if regime 1 applies and 0 if regime 0 applies. The
other is when there exists no separation indicator; it is known which regime
applies for a given observation. In a model of endogenous switching, there
would be a supplementary equation for the separation indicator thus;
S* =  ù Z + î,                                                                                          (6)
S = 1  if  S* > 0 and 0 otherwise.
corr(î, u1t) = ñ1;  corr(î,u2t) = ñ0
This implies a stronger separation model and hence at any observation,
only one regime is observed. Estimating these equations using 2SLS or MLE
may ignore some information. 2SLS may be inefficient.13 The single equation
MLE each re-estimates ù, and hence ignores the fact that ù is being estimated
twice, differently. FIML jointly estimates á, â, ó11, ó00, ñ1 and ñ0 and thus
enables us to overcome some of the shortcomings of 2SLS and MLE while
overcoming the problem of identification.14 Using the Marquardt iterative
procedure, E-Views enables us to estimate the likelihood function under the
assumption that the contemporaneous errors have a joint normal distribution.
FIML is invariant to the equation that is dropped. This we have applied in this
work based on quarterly data for the period 1993-2002.
13 2SLS assumes that there is no contemporaneous correlation in the error terms.
14 Since only one regression is observable at a given observation, ñ10  would not be estimable
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A slightly related issue in this estimation is the stationarity of the data
used. In most of the models in this category, stationarity has not been explicitly
addressed.15 In this study, although we tested for stationarity, we did not go
ahead to attempt an error correction modelling because of the small size of
our data. However, like Ghosh and Ghosh (1999), we believe that estimation
in levels could provide useful results as long as the determinants of credit
supply and credit demand forms a cointegrating vector. This was tested in
this model by checking whether the estimated credit demand, Ld
t, is
cointegrated with observed real credit, Lt (and, likewise, Ls
t is cointegrated
with Lt). Our results show that it is not possible to reject a unit root in all our
variables during the period. Accordingly, the existence of a cointegrating
relationship between the estimated credit demand (credit supply) and the actual
real credit to the private sector (Lt) was tested (see Ghosh and Ghosh, 1999).
The results show that the estimated demand and supply of credit are both
cointegrated with the actual level of credit.
C. Empirical Results
The result of the FIML regression is presented in Table 1 below. The
uniqueness of the estimation period lies in the fact that periods of rising real
lending interest rates (1994.1 to 1998.2) and falling interest rates (1998.3 to
2002.1) are represented thus enabling us to further capture the impact of
lending rates.
The demand for credit equation shows that real interest rate on lending,
expected income, output gap and the inflation rate all affect the demand for
credit. The real interest rate variable is negatively signed and weakly
significant at the 10 % level suggesting that higher real interest rates are
associated with lower credit demand. Expected income is positively related
to the demand for credit and is significant at 1 %, with a coefficient that is
strongly above unity. This variable appears to be the single most important
determinant of the demand for credit. Output gap came out with a negative
15 Catao (1997) is an exception as his study actually utilizes an error correction modeling
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Table 1. FIML Regression Results
Demand function Supply function
Variable Estimation t-statistic Variable Estimation t-statistic
Constant -19.89 -9.234 Constant -0.909 -3.293
Rt -0.028 -3.152 ** Yt -0.591 1.501
Yt 2.421 10.859 *** lt 0.014 2.974 **
Yt-1 -0.073 -1.820 * Mt 0.140 3.913 **
ePt -0.0289 -1.382 Ct 0.194 3.994 **
uPt 0.184 0.513 Dt 0.310 5.597 ***
ePt -0.005 -0.476
s.e. 0.069 s.e. 0.042
R2 0.91 R2 0.96
Log-likelihood 157.88 Log-likelihood 157.88
No. of obs. 40 No. of obs. 40
Notes: *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively.
sign, though significant. This will tend to demonstrate that firms seek less
credit during falling output thus emphasising the importance of demand
factors in the credit equation. Unexpected inflation was not significant in
the credit demand equation. This may be explained by the fact that firms
were able to predict accurately the trends in inflationary expectations and
built this into their demand for credit position.
The credit supply function shows that the bank’s lending capacity has
the expected positive sign and is significant at 1 % level. Average lending
rate is positively correlated with credit supply and is significant at 5 % level.
Stock market index effectively captures optimistic business expectations and
economic buoyancy as this is positively linked with credit supply.16 The
16 This did not come to us as a surprise given the integration of the Namibian and South
African capital markets. South Africa has well developed, well diversified and soundly
regulated capital market. She is also highly integrated  into the global financial market.286 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
expected inflation variable is negatively signed though insignificant. Inflation
may not have been a major consideration in the decision to supply credit by
commercial banks, though as a measure of economic stability, it is rightly
signed. Total deposits are strongly correlated with the supply of credit
confirming the fact that a major source of variation in bank lending is the
volume and variability of deposits. In the alternate regression, the spread
between lending and deposit rates came out with a negative sign (-0.018)
and is significant at 1% level. Overall, the performance of the credit supply
equation is satisfactory with the regressors explaining over 95 % of the change
in the supply of credit. Although expected income came out with the right
sign in the credit supply equation, it turned out to be insignificant.
We have plotted a simple graph of the estimated supply and demand
functions in Figure 3. The extent of the supply and credit crunch can be inferred
from the figure. A discernible pattern emerges from the figure. Between the
period 1993:1 to 1994:3, the demand for credit predominantly outstripped
the supply. However, for the period 1995.1 to 1998.2, the estimated supply
and demand is very close with the supply outstripping demand for most of the
period. From the third quarter of 1998 to the second quarter of 2001, we once
again notice that the demand for credit outstrips the supply and thereafter,
supply overtakes demand.
Generally, one can conclude that both demand and supply factors have
been very relevant for the behaviour of credit in the Namibian economy.
Specifically, for the period of our interest (1997:1 to 1998:4), we observed,
however, that during periods of rising interest rates, actual credit (LRCPS)
actually surpassed the estimated demand and supply of credit and the converse
is the case during periods of falling interest rates. Eviews enabled us to generate
a data dated table of the solved demand and supply equations of 1 and 2. The
estimated supply and demand equations show that between 1998-2000, the
demand for credit outstripped the supply (not reported). Finally, an interesting
observation from our analysis is that throughout the period, both the actual
credit observable and the estimated demand and supply consistently fell far
below commercial bank’s lending capacity (LRCBLC) which increased during
the period of analysis.
From the analysis thus far, it is obvious that commercial bank lending did
take a dip in the second half of the 1990’s. It is difficult to completely ascribe287 WAS THERE A CREDIT CRUNCH IN NAMIBIA BETWEEN 1996-2000?
Figure 3. Estimated Demand (DL), Supply (SL) of Credit, Actual
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the fall in total commercial bank loans to either demand or supply factors.
Demand factors in the guise of high real interest rates and falling real incomes
may have played some role in constraining credit expansion during the period.
But from the results of the regression analysis and the anecdotal evidence
from the disaggregated data, supply factors seemed to have also played a
prominent role.
One possible cause of the supply-constrained phenomenon is the perception
by banks of a high lending risk. The results from the regression analysis show
that even though commercial banks are not sensitive to increases in lending
rates, the spread between lending and deposit rates affect the supply of loans
albeit in a perverse manner.  The interest rate spread though significant came
out with a negative sign. Increased spread should ordinarily cause increased
supply of loans by commercial banks to enable them fulfil their profit
maximisation objective. At higher level of interest rates, the risk of default
increases. However, given a wide spread, commercial banks can maintain the
same level of profitability through their interest income without increasing
the level of credit made available. One reason why this is so in the case of288 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Namibia, is the low level of interest rates commercial banks charge on deposits.
Under the circumstance, banks could reduce their loan supply without
sacrificing their loan income since a compensating effect from the increased
spread can be achieved.
A number of factors may have combined to increase bank’s perception of
higher lending risks. First, there was the high leap in non-performing loans
following the high interest rates regimes that came at the heels of the Asian
crisis in 1997. Second, more stringent capital regulations were also introduced
by the central bank at about this time in response to international regulatory
requirements and the shattering non-performing loans. Increasing non-
performing loans in the wake of the financial crisis, and a tightening of
regulatory standards would have the combined effect of eroding banks capital
base (Berger and Udell, 1994: Sharpe, 1995). Banks, it is argued, will respond
to this by shrinking their risk weighted assets in order to boost capital adequacy
ratios (Woo, 1999). A reduction in risk-weighted assets can be achieved with
minimal effect on total bank assets by curtailing those assets with the highest
risk weightings. Of the assets with the highest risk weighting, bank lending
constitutes the largest component. This may have contributed to the observed
reduction in commercial bank loans.
V. Conclusions
Commercial bank lending in Namibia took a downturn in the second half
of the last decade. Although it is difficult to determine, in the face of obvious
demand factors (rising real interest rate, falling real incomes etc), the extent
to which the credit slowdown can be attributed to credit supply factors, this
study shows that supply factors did play a major role. Thus, this study has
attempted to provide evidence on the existence of a credit crunch in Namibia.
The evidence in this study show that a major factor in the supply driven credit
constraint is the perception by commercial banks of the existence of risks in
lending. Commercial banks have thus tended to be very strict in the kind of
loans they grant and who benefits from such loans. This may have given rise
to the exclusion of marginal borrowers from the commercial bank loans market.
The groups that unfortunately suffer most from such loan policies are the
new entrants to the loans market. This group does not possess acceptable289 WAS THERE A CREDIT CRUNCH IN NAMIBIA BETWEEN 1996-2000?
collateral and even where they do, given their short history of existence in the
commercial loans market, are often subject to more stringent scrutiny prior to
any loan approvals.
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